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INTRODUCTION 
This study, which i s  p a r t  of a l a rge r  study of pro jec t  management, 
(Marquis and St ra ight ,  131 ; Rubin and Marquis [?I ; Rubin [61) vas car- 
r i ed  out t o  inves t iga te  the  e f f ec t s  of  Program Evaluation and Review 
Technique (PERT) on la rge  R&D organizations. 
a scheduling system, p r i o r  research has focused on i t s  effect iveness  
i n  solving scheduling problems ; (see, f o r  example, [ 4  1 ) i n  addition, 
there  has been some research concerning management use and acceptance 
of PERT. 
on the  implementation of PERT by the Department of Defense. 
apparently, much b i t t e rness  generated as a result of t h i s  implementation, 
but as Hayya suggests "Much of the  f r i c t i o n  between t h e  government and 
the  aerospace industry a t t r i bu ted  t o  PERT i s  r ea l ly  due t o  the  o lder ,  
more sub t l e  and extremely more complex marriage between t h e  defense 
establishment and the  aerospace industry". 
Heyya derives a decision model, based upon var iables  such as type and 
s i z e  of contract ,  by means of which a procurement manager m a y  decide t o  
require  t h e  use of PERT. 
valuable, it does leave some questions unanswered. 
Since PERT i s  primarily 
Hayya, (Hayya [l]) f o r  instance,  has done an exhaustive study 
There was, 
(Hayya, 1966, pages 2-3) 
Although t h i s  type of research is  extremely 
For example, Hilton, (Hilton, [21) i n  a study of seven companies 
E=+, @~,=-i* engqed ?.=o,ea,-& ~5 %yelw~e=+ fc)*~c5 thp+ pp fs e 
the  ind iv idua l  companies w e r e  concerned the reason f o r  using PERT is not 
always so le ly  t o  improve scheduling: 
w a s  not  savings i n  cost  o r  time but r a the r  improved ccunmunications and 
"The most frequently c i t ed  advantage 
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cooperation between groups involved i n  a project". 
pages 28) 
icat ions are often due t o  the  fact tha t  i n  order t o  set up the  PERT 
chart  the m a n  i n  charge of the  project m u s t  become fami l ia r  with all 
stages of t h e  job, and tha t  i n  the  planning meetings before t h e  job 
begins t h e  individuals i n  charge of t h e  various subac t iv i t ies  become 
acquainted with each o ther ' s  problems. Convincing people i n  an organ- 
i za t ion  t h a t  PERT can be helpPul i s  a l so  a problem: "Introducing the  
method often required a soft sell ,  and most firms agree tha t  it takes 
up t o  f ive  years t o  obtain complete acceptance." 
(Hilton, 1966 
Hilton also notes a t  t h i s  point tha t  t he  improved commun- 
(Hilton, 1966, pages 32) 
Poust, i n  a study of large scale  government sponsored R&D projects  
(Poust and Rubin, [SI) has pointed out an in te res t ing  anomaly i n  t h e  roles 
of  t h e  project  manager and the  lab manager. They w e r e  asked t o  l i s t  the  
most important problems facing a person i n  their  posi t ion.  
asked t o  estimate how they spent t h e i r  t i m e  on t h e  project  under invest i -  
gat ion across a series of comparable problem areas. Heither t h e  project  
nor t h e  lab managers spend t h e i r  time on those problems which they con- 
s i d e r  t o  be generally most important. For example, although across t h e  
sample of pro jec ts  s tudied they both spend most of t h e i r  time f ight ing 
"fires", ( technical ,  cost , and schedule) , t h e  project  manager considers 
f inding methods of controll ing these problems by far the  most imporbent 
aspect of h i s  job while t he  lab manager thinks t h a t  f inding and keeping 
competent people and providing motivation f o r  those currently working on 
pro jec t s  are t h e  most important aspect of h i s  job. 
They were a l s o  
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In  the l i g h t  of these kinds of evidence it i s  reasonable t o  ask 
several  kinds of questions about what the  introduction of PERT w i l l  do 
t o  an RLD organization. W i l l  t he  use of PERT create conditions favor- 
able t o  better communications? W i l l  there be resis tance t o  i t s  use? 
Will t h e  use of PERT cause changes in  authority s t ructures  that w i l l  
tend t o  bring t h e  ac tua l  problem structures  which t h e  lab manager and 
project  manager face more i n  l i n e  with t he  ones which they consider 
t o  be generally most important? In addition t o  these organizational 
i s sues ,  questions regarding the  impact of u t i l i z i n g  PERT on project  
performance w i l l  a l so  be examined. 
METHOD 
Sample Character is t ics  
A project  w a s  se lected i n  a canpany or  a government agency on two 
(1) randm or most recently completed, and (2 )  more than $1 c r i t e r i a :  
mill ion i n  s i z e .  
agencies. The firms studied are a l l  i n  the  aerospace and electronics  
indus t r ies ,  and 80 percent of them are among the  100 la rges t  performers 
of government-funded R&D. They are  located i n  a l l  par t s  of t h e  country. 
The projects  w e r e  contracted by twelve government 
The projects  ranged i n  s i ze  from $1 mil l ion t o  $60 mill ion with a 
median of $4 mill ion.  
none lasted more than 6 years. 
vances i n  t h e  "state of the  art" i n  a technological f i e l d  such as advanced 
radar  systems, microminiaturization of e lectronics  modules, e lec t ronic  
data processing interfaces  w i t h  telemetry systems, e tc .  
studied are more developmental than fundamental research. 
The average project duration w a s  3.4  years and 
Almost al l  of the projects  required ad- 
The projects  
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Infomation on each pro jec t  w a s  obtained from five sources: the 
laboratory manager (LM), the project  manager (PM) , t h e  government 
technical  monitor 
and the company contract  administrator ( C A ) .  
p ro jec ts  were s tudied,  inevi tab le  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  securing sane of the 
desired information resu l ted  i n  incomplete records i n  several  cases. 
In 75% of  the cases the  records a re  complete (LM, CA, PM, GTM, and GCA). 
Incomplete information r e s u l t s  primarily from an i n a b i l i t y  t o  interview 
e i t h e r  t h e  LM, GTM, o r  t h e  GCA. 
and o ther  methods such as bar charts ,  gantt  charts and milestone 
ident i f icat ion w e r e  used on 18: 
on the remaining 6 .  
( G ' I M ) ,  t h e  government contract  administrator (GCA) , 
Although a t o t a l  of 48 
Pert was used on 24 of these pro jec ts  
scheduling infomat ion  w a s  not avai lable  
Cost and Schedule Performance 
Information on cost and schedule changes w a s  gathered from the  pro jec t  
manager and contract  administrator i n  t he  company and from t h e  government 
contract  administrator.  Careful cross-checking on t h e  reasons f o r  contract  
changes m a d e  it possible t o  eliminate those caused by a customer's act ion,  
such as a change i n  scope o r  spec i f ica t ions ,  o r  the unavai labi l i ty  of gov- 
ernment test equipment o r  f a c i l i t i e s .  Thus only those slippages which 
were d i r ec t ly  a t t r i bu tab le  t o  the  actions of t h e  contractor firm are  in-  
cluded. While t h e  data do not at  present include t h e  amount of cost and 
schedule variance,  only those grea te r  than 10 percent are included. On 
t h i s  basis the re  were 28 overruns and 16 on t a rge t  o r  underruns. The rank 
cor re la t ion  between cost  and schedule performance w a s  0.82, so t h e  two are 
combined t o  form a s ingle  performance measure. 
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Te chni c a l  Pe rforman ce 
It i s  presently impossible t o  compare t h e  te-chnical performance of 
different  projects  by any objective measures. 
may be the  primary technical objective of a system (missile, a i rplane,  
e tc .  1, while i n  another case range i s  most c r i t i c a l .  
system, r e l i a k i l i t y  o r  maintainability m a y  be the  chief goal. 
the  measure of successful technical performance used i n  t h i s  study are 
expert judgments by the  most fWly informed individuals. 
In  one instance,  speed 
In an electronics  
Consequently 
Success ra t ings were obtained independently from the project  manager, 
t he  laboratory manager, the government contract administrator and t h e  
technical  monitor. 
nine representing an outstanding success and one s ign iming  a f a i lu re  
( i n  some r e l a t ive  sense, since no project i n  t h i s  study achieved the ab- 
so lu te  f a i lu re  of being cancelled b’efore completion). 
The rat ings were on a scale  from one t o  nine,  w i t h  
The measure of performance used i n  t h i s  study is  t h e  average of t he  
rat ings provided by t h e  project m a n a g e r  and t h e  government technical  mon- 
i t o r ,  plus a constant term t o  account f o r  t h e  fac t  t h a t  project  managers 
were consis tent ly  more opt imist ic  than technical  monitors. All except 
one of these scores f e l l  i n  t he  range of f ive  t o  nine within which there  
w a s  a symmetrical d i s t r ibu t ion  with t h e  median a t  6.4. For t he  sample of 
projects i;t.;12fe2, t e ~ \ n i z a l  g e r f c r ~ c e  is 1mrelat.crl t o  cost and schedule 
performance. 
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Authority Structure  
In  order t o  get  some idea  of t he  authori ty  s t ruc tu re  of the organi- 
zation, both the  LM and the PM were asked a nwnber of questions concerning 
decision making power i n  various areas. (See t a b l e  I)  
On any given project  there  are  three l eve l s  w i t h i n  t he  laboratory at 
which decisions may be made: 
subordinates, by t h e  pro jec t  manager, o r  by laboratory management. 
first of these two are considered within the  project  area and t h e  l a t t e r  
outside the  project  area. 
they may be made by the  project manager's 
The 
Communi cation 
The kind of ccanmunication which w e  are t ry ing  t o  measure is  e s sen t i a l ly  
informal r a the r  than formal. That i s ,  we are t ry ing  t o  measure the  effec- 
t iveness  of ex i s t ing  communication l i n k s ,  i n  pa r t i cu la r  the PM-LM l i n k ,  
rather than looking at the  communication s t ruc ture .  
at the present t i m e ,  be in fe ren t i a l .  The method which we have used is  t o  
c a l l  t h e  LM ra t ing  of PM technica l  performance and informal communication 
measure. More spec i f i ca l ly ,  w e  expect t h a t  on those projects  using PERT, 
a LM w i l l  t h ink  t h a t  h i s  PM i s  doing a superior  job. This feel ing on t h e  
par t  of t h e  XM w i l l  be independent of  how well  the  PM i s  actual ly  doing. 
Any such process m u s t ,  
This expectation r e s t s  upon the assumption, substant ia ted by Hil ton 's  
work mentioned e a r l i e r ,  that  the LM and PM w i l l  b e t t e r  understand each 
*Ither 's  pro3lems as a r e su l t  of t h e  planning meeGings associated with the 
u t i l i z a t i o n  of PERT. 
Table 1 
Decision Level Questions Asked of 
Project Manager and Laboratory Manager 
Who i n  t h e  Organization Made the  Following 
Decisions f o r  t h i s  ProJect? 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Authorization of t o t a l  overtime budget 
Contract change i n  schedule o r  cost 
Authorization t o  exceed company funding 
Exceed approved personnel rushing f o r  
crashing project 
I n i t i a t i o n  of work i n  support sreas 
Assign p r i o r i t y  of work ;? support areas 
Change schedules f o r  project  subact ivi t ies  
Make versus buy (whether t o  subcontract) 
Select  subcontractors 
Select  sources of supply (off s h e l f  items) 
Hire additional people 
Contract change i n  technical scope 
( o r  content) 
Bring subcontracted work in-house 
Authorize subcontractors t o  exceed cost 
o r  schedule 
Authorize subcontractor t o  reriuce techiicril 
content 
O m i t  tests 
Relax performance requirements 
C re ate addi t i onal con current s ch e dule s 
PM'S 
SUBORDINATES 
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RESULTS 
The analysis procedure w a s  t o  use the  18 pro jec ts  which d id  not 
use PERT as a "control" group and compare them with the 24 which did.  
In order  t o  control  f o r  any contaminating influences i n  t h e  analysis ,  
the da ta  were first checked t o  see i f  t h e  results were due t o  any ob- 
viously exogenous sources. The f i r s t  two sources which were checked 
were do l l a r  s i z e  and degree of has te  i .e . ,  whether o r  not it w a s  a 
crash program. 
1 
The reason f o r  checking these two pa r t i cu la r  areas i s  
Table I1 
Uti l iza t ion  of PERT vs. Dollar Size of Project  
NUMBER NUMBER OF Q 
SIZE/106 OF PROJECTS PERT PROJECTS % PERT 
1 
2 
3-4 (INCL.) 
6-10 ( IICL. ) 
> 10 
5 
6 
8 
6 
3 
2 
4 
4 
6 3 - 
31 15  
Fisher Exact (SPLIT ON MEDIAN) <.41 
60% 
33% 
50% 
66% 
50% 
Throughout the  analysis a significance l e v e l  of .05 (one t a i l )  was used. 
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Table I11 
PERT vs. Crash Programs 
CRASH 34% I 59% 1 
NON CRASH I 66% I 41% I 
~ = 2 6  N=17 
FISKER EXACT f.15 
t h a t  e i t h e r  of these  fac tors  may well affect the  i n t e r n a l  p r i o r i t y  which 
the  organization gives t o  t h e  project .  
t h a t  technical  performance is c r i t i c a l l y  sens i t i ve  t o  in t e rna l  p r i o r i t y .  
However, it is  readily obvious (see tab les  I1 and 111) t h a t  PERT i s  not 
pa r t i cu la r ly  associated with e i t h e r  high or  low pro jec t  do l l a r  value o r  
crash o r  non-crash p r i o r i t y .  
w 8 9  t h e  date t h e  pro jec t  s t a r t ed .  
t h i s  var iab le  we m u s t  d e w  the h i s t o r i c a l  perspective both of the  da ta  
and of t h e  use of  PERT. 
roughly with t h e  per iod of time during which PERT was introduced. 
happened tha t  a l l  of our PERT projects  had begun, s a y ,  i n  the  last 3 years ,  
then our results could be upen t o  the  in te rpre ta t ion  t h a t  the e f f e c t s  are 
due t o  a time displacement r a the r  than t o  PERT i t s e l f .  
Rubin (Rubin, [61) has found 
The other  var iable  which we controlled f o r  
To understand t h e  necessi ty  f o r  checking 
The time spen of  the  da ta ,  1957 t o  1963, coincides 
I f  it 
However t h i s  i s  not 
t h e  case. (see Table IV) 
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TECHNICAL 
PERFORMANCE 
% GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO MEDIAN 
Table I V  
U t i l i za t ion  of  PERT vs. Year Project  S t a r t ed  
56% 59% 
1957 1 0% 
1958 
1960 
2 
5 
50% 
40% 
1961 12 5 8% 
1962 
196 3 
7 
? 
5 7% 
67% 
P e r t  vs. Perfo-qg.n.nc 
There i s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  difference i n  technica l  performance be- 
(See Table V) tween p ro jec t s  which used PERT and those which d idn ' t .  
Table V 
Relation h tween PERT and Technical Performance 
% LESS THAN MEDIAN L 44% I 41% 
N=2 4 ~=18 ' 
MA" WHITNEY U NOT SIGNIFICANT -
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% OVERRUNS 
There i s  however, a s ign i f icant  difference i n  cost/schedule per- 
formance between those projects  which use PERT and those which do not.  
(Table V I )  Pert  projects  do b e t t e r  i n  cost  and schedule performance than 
do non-pert projects .  
have previously believed i n  PERT 8s a scheduling tooi. 
This will not come 85 a great  shock t o  those who 
42% 67% 
Table V I  
Relation Between PERT and Schedule Performance 
PERT MON PERT 
1 
% NON OVERRUNS I 5 8% I 33% I 
N=20 m=16 
FISHER EXACT PROBABILITY <.OS 
Pert  vs. Authority Structure 
As might be expected, it is m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  determine differences 
i n  authori ty  s t ruc ture  than it is t o  f i nd  differences i n  technical  and 
cost/schedule performance. 
l ab  m a n a g e r s '  responses t o  t he  decision l eve l  queati6i i  (see T&1e I?  2 ~ :  
PERT pro jec ts  t o  t h e  responses on non-PERT project ,  
s ign i f i can t  differences. 
The approach w e  used here w a s  t o  compare t h e  
There were f i v e  
(see Table V I I ) .  For example, t he  LM i s  much 
more l i k e l y  t o  think he has the  authority t o  change schedules f o r  project  
subac t iv i t i e s  i f  he i s  working on a PERT project  than he i s  i f  he i s  
working on a non-PERT project.  
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Table V I 1  
Lab Manager Perceived Authority Structure on PEE?? Projects 
DECISION AREA AUTHORITY LEVEL IS: 
------.-. -.%-I I N  THE UUl'bi~fi ' m b  
PROJECT AREA PROJECT AREA 
ESTABLISH PRIORITY * 
AUTHORIZE OVERTIME BUDGET * 
MAKE THE DECISION TO SUBCONTRACT * 
INITIATE WORK I N  A SUPPORT AREA * 
CHANGE SCHEDULES FOR PROJECT 
SUBACTIVITIES * 
As w a s  mentioned previously, "in t h e  project  area" means e i t h e r  with 
t h e  pro jec t  m a n a g e r  o r  h i s  subordinates; "outside t h e  project  area" means 
with t h e  lab  manager. As a check on t h e  results, t he  answers which t h e  F'M 
gave t o  the same question were also checked. 
was agreement: t h e  exception WELS "establish p r i o r i t y  .I' 
each thought t h a t  t he  o ther  had authority i n  t h i s  area. 
In all cases except one, there  
In  t h i s  instance,  
Communication 
- me inforin& e ~ i i i z z ~ i c z t ~ c ~  mpn_c:1-1.re which we have used i s  LM ra t ing  
of  PM technical  performance. 
pro jec ts  give considerably b e t t e r  performance rat ings t o  t h e i r  p ro jec t  
managers than do those on non-PERT projects .  
As anticipated t h e  lab  managers on PERT 
(See Table VIII) Validation 
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61% % RECEIVING EXCELLENT RATING 
Table VI11 
Lab Manager Rating of Project Manager Performance vs. PERT 
29% I 
I 
, PER" , NO'. PERT , 
% RFXEIVING LESS THAN EXCELLENT k 39% I 71% I 
RATING 
~ = 2  3 ~ 1 7  
FISHER EXACT < .05 
. I  
of t h e  assumption i s  ;one by comparing the  LM r a t i n g  of PM technical  
performance w i t h  ac tua l  project  performance. The r e s u l t s  are t h a t  i n  
f a c t  t h e  LM, r a t ing  i s  not related t o  ac tua l  project  performance. (Table I X )  
As was mentioned previously,  the process of informal communication 
measurement must be in fe ren t i a l .  The inference which w e  draw from t h i s  
sorewhat surprising: result i s  t h a t  when t h e  LM mswered t h i s  question he 
was not  thinking about how w e l l  t h e  PFI ac tua l ly  performed technica l ly ,  
but how w e l l  lie ( t h e  LM) could r e l a t e  t o  t h e  research process through t h e  
Pb?, and t h i s  i s  a neasure of comunication. The l ab  mazager's r a t ing  of  
t h e  p ro jec t  manager's administrative a b i l i t y  w a s  unrelated t o  ac tua l  cost  
and schedule performance which fur ther  strengthens t h i s  argument. 
I .  
% GREATER 
% LESS THAN MEDIAN 
TECHNICAL THAN (OR EQUAL TO) MEDIAN 
PF EXCELLENT .LESS THAN EXCELLENT 
42% 52% 
5 8% 4 8% 
r 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
There are two def in i te  conclusions which can be drawn from the results. 
F i r s t ,  PERT does lead t o  improvement of schedule performance and secondly, 
it does s o  without any noticeable effect  on technical  performance. The 
o the r  results shed some l i g h t  on how projects  t h a t  use PERT differ from 
those t h a t  do not ,  and provide some basis f o r  speculating on how t h e  im-  
orovement is achieved. 
The improvement i n  communication w i t h  t h e  use of PERT i s  indicat ive of 
an increase i n  lab manager visibii l i ty t o  the  project manager. 
it is  in t e re s t ing  t o  note tha t  t h e  areas i n  which t h e  LM i s  more v is ib le ,  
i .e.,  i n  i n i t i a t i n g  work and changing schedules, both l i e  i n  the  scheduling 
And visa versa 
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domain. In other  words, the improved cornnunicetion is  channeled i n t o  
the  scheduling function ra ther  than, s a y ,  the  technical  area. 
kind of organization i s  log ica l  from a motivational viewpoint because 
t.he ltxh manager i s  probably more concerned with scheduling than is the  
project  manager. PERT enables the lab manager t o  communicate h i s  con- 
cerns t o  t h e  project  maneger. 
This 
In t h i s  l i gh t ,  the establishment of p r io r i ty  conf l ic t  i s  ra ther  
interest ing.  
has t h i s  authori ty . )  If, as we have surmised, t h e  IM has moved i n t o  
the  scheduling area, he subsequently ought a l so  t o  have some control 
over p r io r i ty .  However, the relationship between p r io r i ty  and completion 
is  not d i r ec t ,  and it i s  possible tha t  the  lab manager i s  pushing hard 
enough i n  t h i s  area so t h a t  the PM fee ls  t h a t  the LM has the authority 
although the  IM is  not qui te  ready t o  admit that he i s  determining 
p r i o r i t i e s .  
cedes some i n  the  areas of subcontracting and overtime budget. This 
may be a p o l i t i c a l  move t o  keep the PM happy, o r  it may be tha t  t h e  LM 
simply does not have time t o  do both. However, the  net effect  allows 
t h e  PM two more too ls  with which t o  solve the technical  and cost ''fires". 
Combining t h i s  information w i t h  Powt ' s  study, w e  f ind that  t h i s  s h i f t  
br ings t h e  project  manager's job cioser t o  the w s y  ir: ?&ich he actually 
perceives it. 
(As noted before the  I M  and PM each think t h a t  the other  
While "gaining" authority i n  t h e  scheduling area,  the LM 
In sumnary, using PERT does lead t o  bet ter  cost/schedule performance 
but has no e f f e c t  on technical  performance. However, w e  suspect t h a t  the  
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reason fo r  the improvement i n  scheduling performance l ies not i n  t he  
fac t  that  PERT i s  a bet ter  scheduling technique, but t h a t  it provides 
a method by which the  person i n  t h e  organization who i s  concerned wi th  
scheduling ( i n  t h i s  case, the LM) can gain authori ty  i n  t h i s  area. 
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